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Contemporary skepticism concerning the mental 
within philosophy of mind and psychology certainly 
seems to have created hard times for ethics. Eliminative 
materialists like Stich (1983) attack the very foundation 
on which moral theories are based. Since moral theories 
assume a certain amount of intentionality as a building 
block for their legislation ofrights and obligations, any 
positions that could demonstrate in some form that such 
an assumption is unwarranted, in that beliefs, desires 
and mental states in general cannot be shown to exist, 
would seem to spell death for the ethical realm. Ifmoral 
theories require realism about cognitive elements and 
their states yet are unable to present us with the evidence 
that will support this requirement, then they must either 
give up this requirement, and accept the view that moral 
agents and subjects no longer have any sure footing 
with regard to their claims concerning moral behavior 
toward themselves and others, or recognize some other 
way on which to ground their views. Does it have to be 
the case, for instance, that consciousness and sentience 
are the only conditions on which moral status can be 
ascribed to beings? Or can we refer to some other 
condition or set of conditions? Can we perhaps expand 
our concept of morality to include animals yet without 
necessarily raising the problems associated with 
attributions of intentionality? The general focus of this 
paper, then, concerns my interest in the conditions that 
make moral judgments about animals true. Hence, I am 
concerned with moral epistemology, not axiology. 
In Part I, I present a cursory analysis of Stich's view 
concerning ascriptions of beliefs to humans as well as 
to animals. In Part II, I analyze Regan's arguments for 
why certain animals ought to be regarded as moral 
subjects as well as his response to Stich's position. My 
intention behind presenting Regan's position is twofold: 
(1) to show that Stich's position creates some difficulty 
for Regan's ultimate goal of ascribing rights to animals 
and (2) to point out that the comparison of animal to 
human belief structures is not an effective way to ground 
what possible claims they may have against us. I 
conclude on a somewhat Heideggarian note in Part III. 
I argue that animals and nature itself may be deserving 
of some moral recognition just by virtue of the fact that 
they afford us possibilities with respect to what we can 
and do become. "Value," in a certain sense, is to be 
found external to ourselves. 
Part I 
In their effort to respond to reductionists who 
contend that beliefs correspond to certain neurological 
states, eliminativists want to discard the intentional 
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idioms employed by folk psychological theories. Their 
main purpose for doing so is that such mentalistic 
vocabulary does not refer to anything. They eventually 
hope to employ a new language, one which would better 
explain human behavior. At the other end of the spectrum, 
instrumentalists, proceeding on a more extensive concept 
of "belief," contend that we can still adequately explain 
behavior with our folk psychological concepts, Le., that 
"beliefs," "desires," "expectations" and the like are helpful 
heuristic devices for the prediction of behavior. The 
instrumentalist's concept of belief ascriptions is not 
limited to the description ofneural events but also involves 
reference to our environment. Whether or not we really 
do have beliefs, however, is not their primary concern. 
What's important is that our predictions work. Realists, 
like Fodor, take the fact that we have managed for 
thousands of years with these predictions as a certain 
amount of evidence supporting their view that beliefs do 
exist. But, of course, one can't just isolate this fact as 
adequate evidence that beliefs do in fact exist, since to do 
so would amount to nothing more than an ad populum. 
Clearly, more needs to be said on the subject, and one 
mustrecognize thateliminativists are waiting in the wings 
to warn us that we may not only be overly optimistic 
about the accuracy of these predictions; we may also be 
overrating our very ability to predict behavior. 
Although generally referred to as an eliminativist, 
Stephen Stich appears to occupy a midway position 
between the eliminativist and the instrumentalist. Stich 
advocates a syntactic theory of mind which holds that 
while there is no type-type theory with regard to one's 
mental states and physical states, Le., that one is not 
reducible to the other, there seems to be something akin 
to a type-token system where certain amounts of 
"mentalese" appear to "map onto" certain amounts of 
physical states. My belief that "I have a headache," for 
example, means more than the experience ofa particular 
chemical disbalance; in addition, it refers to my 
awareness that having such an experience is one to be 
avoided. So Stich, in this sense, shares the wider sense 
of belief that the instrumentalist employs. However, 
acceptance of this view in no way commits Stich to the 
position that there really are beliefs, desires, etc. Stich, 
of course, denies any such inference, and it is in this 
sense that he is considered an eliminativist. Although 
he is sympathetic to the plight of the folk psychologist 
here, he remains open to the possibility of finding some 
new medium with which to interpret behavior. Hence, 
he adopts what is referred to as the "Quinean double-
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standard:"! Le., he takes the position that beliefs don't 
exist in light of folk ps ychology's inadequate evidence 
for their existence, yet he also takes the position that 
allowing a total dispensation of our intentional idioms 
would leave us, to borrow a phrase from Wittgenstein, 
"unable to go on" as we have been. So, Stich is content, 
at least presently, with saying that there are events 
that we refer to as "the belief that p" but that such 
expressions don't refer to anyone type of event. 
Given that, Stich goes on to give an account of what 
he believes warrants our intuitions regarding belief 
ascriptions. When we attribute "the belief that p" to 
another, Stich points out that there exists an assumption 
on our part that this other individual is like us in that he 
will arrive at the same conclusion(s) given the same 
context. What's going on here is not so much an 
assumption of similarity with respect to the content of 
another's state but rather an assumption of similarity 
with respect to the behavior expected. Any description 
given of individuals as having the same belief will 
reflect the interests and expectations of the attributor, 
and nothing more than that, and, of course, this 
supposition also holds for ascriptions of mental states 
to animals as well. Stich lays out three different criteria 
for determining whether or not someone can be said to 
have beliefs similar to others in their group: the first 
criteria is in terms of functional or causal-pattern 
similarity; the second condition emphasizes referential 
similarity; and the third factor is ideological similarity. 
Stich's purpose behind listing the above factors is to 
show how some contexts will highlight reference, while 
others will emphasize the other factors. Which one gets 
emphasized depends, of course, on the concerns of the 
one ascribing the belief. 
Let me explain each of these factors briefly. In order 
to have two beliefs count as causal-pattern similar, there 
would have to be some demonstration that the 
perceptual and inferential abilities were alike enough 
to warrant them both having "the belief that p," Le., 
that the individuals would have to act similarly given 
the same situation or, to put it in another way, that these 
individuals were disposed to behave in similar ways. 
Given, for example, that the brain functional capacities 
of advanced Alzheimer patients are so impaired, and as 
a result many of the statements they utter are 
inappropriate to the contexts that they're stated in, we 
would be inclined to say that their beliefs in those 
instances are unlike ours and that they are in a different 
type of mental state. Referential similarity and 
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ideological similarity seem to assume a certain amount 
of functional similarity, but it's not clear that that would 
have to be the case. Leaving that point aside, two 
individuals can be said to exhibit referential similarity 
if the object of their beliefs is the same. If what I'm 
referring to is not what you're referring to when we 
utter the same word or phrase, then we can't be said to 
share the same belief. Ideological similarity implies a 
shared network of beliefs. Two people are counted as 
ideologically similar if they can draw certain (basic) 
inferences from the statements that are uttered by 
themselves and/or other speakers. If, for instance, I utter 
the statement "Tom is an astronaut" yet can give no 
explanation of who Tom is nor any explanation 
concerning what an astronaut is, you would be justified 
in claiming that, ideologically, I am dissimilar to you. I 
am, in any event, using words that I don't understand. 
Now, this set-up does permit us to say when it is 
appropriate to ascribe beliefs and other propositional 
attitudes to an individual, but how does it fare with respect 
to animals? Stich believes that, in general, animals 
are causal-pattern dissimilar, since neither their 
perception nor their inferential capacities work 
quite the way ours do. And they are ideolog-
ically dissimilar, since their doxastic network 
differs markedly from our own. Since they 
have no language, reference similarity is out 
of the question, though the causal history 
component of reference similarity may have 
an analogue in the causal history of animal 
concepts... (These) dissimilarities lead us to 
expect that we will have conflicting intuitions 
about the appropriateness of using everyday 
English content sentences to characterize the 
cognitive states of animals.2 
Indeed, it seems that in many situations it would be 
difficult to specify the contents of animal beliefs and 
other propositional attitudes. This seems true especially 
with regard to the behavior of certain animals like frogs, 
for example, and in such cases one really wouldn't need 
to revert to anything more than Dennett's design level 
in an effort to understand the frog's "psychology."3 But 
can we say the same for Fido? The dog is physiolog-
ically more complex than the frog (it is more like us in 
that regard), and its behavior exhibits that complexity. 
Unlike the frog, it appears to have expectations (its 
movement toward the front door when its Master is due 
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to arrive home), desires and goals (its jumping up and 
down for its ball and its running in order to get the 
ball). Butis it the case thatFidohas such beliefs, desires, 
etc.? Stich is willing to allow the ascription of certain 
beliefs and desires to animals if they exhibit similar 
patterns of behavior. In like circumstances, if humans 
can be said to have beliefs, then so can animals.4 The 
interesting issue here, though, is whether animals do 
exhibit similar patterns of behavior and whether it is 
evident enough of the time for us to warrant some 
assumption of similarity. In any event, whatever Stich 
decided, he would not ascribe full-fledged similarity. 
He really believes animals to be too unlike us for that. 
In what follows, I look at Regan's arguments for 
why certain animals can be said to be enough like us to 
justify ascriptions not only of beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes to them, but also ascriptions of 
value to them. 
Part II 
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan presents 
his Cumulative ArgumentS in order to show that 
consistency requires an attribution ofconsciousness and 
sentience to (certain) animals just by virtue of the fact 
that humans, who have evolved from such animals, are 
shown and said to have such characteristics. The animals 
he refers to here are mammalian animals, one year and 
older, and he sets out to prove that such animals satisfy 
his Subject-of-a-Life Criterion and, hence, can be said 
to have inherent value based on that satisfaction. A 
Subject-of-a-Life is described as one who has 
beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and 
a sense of the future, including their own 
future; an emotional life together with feelings 
ofpleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-
interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit 
of their desires and goals; a psychophysical 
identity over time; and an individual welfare 
in the sense that their experiental life fares 
well or ill for them, logically independently 
of their utility for others and logically 
independently of their being the object of 
anyone else's interests.6 
Regan points out tllat animals such as Fido fulfill this 
description, that they do have certain preference-beliefs 
and will seek to satisfy such desires. This, Regan 
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argues, is evident when we observe Fido digging up a 
certain spot in order to retrieve his bone. Can this 
behavior be explained solely at the design level? No 
more than ours can, given its complexity. This type of 
action indicates that what is occurring is more than just 
a mere disposition to behave a certain way. Some 
second-order intentionality is apparent in its behavior. 
Fido, in certain contexts, does seem to be "happy," 
"eager," "ashamed," etc. But, as Regan warns us, in 
order to justify these ascriptions, we cannot view the 
animal's behavior atomistically, e.g., just see Fido's tail 
wagging and infer from that that Fido is "happy." We 
need to justify those ascriptions on a holistic basis, i.e., 
recognize the relation obtaining between the context 
and Fido's behavior.? If we follow the latter method, 
we will be able to offer some assessment (an adequate 
one for Regan) of Fido's actions and, hence, be able to 
predict certain patterns of behavior. And this, of course, 
resembles what we do in our assessment of human 
behavior to a certain extent. 
Regan, however, wants to go a step beyond what 
Stich and others would be willing to do at this point. 
He claims that animals like Fido also possess certain 
(albeit partial) concepts of things in the world. Fido, 
for instance, has his concept of a bone, i.e., that it is 
something to bury, something to chew on, something 
that will satisfy a certain craving, and the like.s Stich, 
however, draws the line at this point: if Fido really 
does have such a concept, then why doesn't he treat 
other things that are bones as bones?9 What Stich is 
looking for here is some evidence that Fido views bones 
qua bones. Stich eisewhere10 raises the following 
similar point: 
does Fido really believe it is a squirrel up in 
the oak tree? Are there not indefinitely many 
logically possible creatures which are not 
squirrels but which Fido would treat indistin-
guishably from the way he treats real squirrels? 
Indeed, does he believe, or even care, that the 
thing up the tree is an animal? Would it not be 
quite the same to Fido if he had been chasing 
some bit of squirrel-shaped and squirrel-
smelling machinery, like the mechanical 
rabbits at dog-racing tracks? 
What Stich obviously wants to emphasize here is that 
Fido is ideologically dissimilar to us, that Fido, for 
instance, does not possess the concepts of living and 
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non-living which are part ofour concept of animal. This 
seems true to a certain extent, but this point by itself 
does not suffice as an adequate refutation of Regan's 
contention that Fido has some concepts. After all, what 
are the essential features in recognizing that the object 
is squirrel? Aren't the shape and the smell here the 
outstanding and necessary features to notice? 
However, although I am sympathetic to Regan's 
claim that Fido does have some concept, even if it is a 
limited one, of a bone or a squirrel, there still needs to 
be more said on the nature of concepts. What would 
constitute the identity conditions for a concept? For 
instance, how extensive must the set of beliefs be in 
order for one to say that they have such a concept? Is it 
enough, for example, to say that I have the concept of a 
bone if I only have the beliefs that bones have a certain 
shape and density? At what point do I qualify as having 
the concept? If I am fooled, or am unable to pick out 
the referent in this one case, does that entail that I don't 
have some understanding of what a bone is? It is 
interesting to note at this point in the discussion that if 
another human being surprises us by her behavior in a 
certain case, which is just to say that she hasn't met our 
expectations in that situation, we usually tend to adopt 
a principle of charity toward her. We attempt to 
reconstruct some rationality to her situation. For 
example, the secretary in our office tells me that she is 
so hot and would love to have an ice cream cone. She 
then goes on to count her change, realizing that she has 
enough money to buy one. And off she goes to the 
University Union where they sell ice cream cones. So 
guess what I believe she'll come back with? But she 
doesn't come back with an ice cream cone; she returns 
instead with a sandwich. Do I now see her as irrational? 
No. I say to myself that "she must have had some 
reason for deciding the way she did." I give her the 
benefit of the doubt. But, in the case of animals, even 
our faithful Fido, we rarely apply a principle of charity 
in their situations. 
At most what can be said at this point is that the 
extension of Fido's "concepts" of bone and squirrel are 
different from ours. And so, by Stich's standards, this 
would indicate a certain amount, at least, of referential 
dissimilarity. Yet, the important question here is: even 
if there is a lot of ideological and referential dissimilarity 
between animals and us, does it follow that we can do 
what we want to them? Is there some other way to 
ground the view that animals deserve a certain amount 
of ethical treatment other than referring to views 
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concerning intentionality and its related issues? How 
do we convince others that the fight here is worth it? I 
now tum to Part III. 
Part UJ 
Keep in mind that Regan's purpose bebind his 
arguments is to make a "case for animal rights." He 
ascribes rigbts to animals on the basis that they have 
inherent value, that they satisfy his Subject-of-a-Life 
Criterion. ll Yet, note what is actually going on here: in 
bis effort to abandon species-chauvinism, he has, in fact, 
been species-chauvinistic. The human belief-structure 
is the paradigm with whicb he compares other animals. 
The closer they are to being like us, the more we are 
willing to ascribe them some value. It seems to me, 
thougb, that the important issue bere is not wbether 
animals can be said to bave concepts or are ideologically 
similar or dissimilar to us. In fact, concentrating solely 
on those aspects seems to miss the mark of a moral 
tbeory wbich should be to construct sensible and 
acceptable, if not ideal, norms for behavior. And, it's 
not clear to me why we necessarily have to posit 
intentionality as the deciding factor in questions 
concerning what is to count as valuable and, hence, 
deserving of moral respect. 
In general, moral theorists have consistently viewed 
the human animal as the most valuable one, as the one 
whose interests and rights can override the rights (if 
there be any) of any other being in the world. In fact, 
many rheorists believe that humans deserve greater 
moral consideration by virtue of the fact that they are 
autonomous beings and capable of doing more things 
than the "lower" animals. But is desert warranted here? 
Holding this position amounts to no more than viewing 
our position in the evolutionary scale as analogous to 
some achievement on our part, that it's somewhat of an 
accomplishment tllat we "managed" to get to the top 
of tlle process, and because of that, we've earned a 
certain amount of consideration. Yet tllis is not tlle case: 
we are just members of a species that evolved, and 
with that process came a greater adaptability to the 
environment. So as a species we ended up witll an 
advanced belief structure. Yet having a greater 
potential to manipulate one's environment is not 
something we earned. 
We should also at this time keep in mind that if it 
turns out that eliminativism is true, we are not in a better 
position than the animals here. If we have a problem 
Between the Species 
grounding our own intentionality, how will we ascribe 
moral worth to ourselves? If it turns out that beliefs 
and desires are fictions, wbat will become of our status 
as moral agents? Gregory Sberidan raises this concern 
in tlle following way: 
The concept of a moral agent may be largely a 
prescriptive or evaluative one. It will depend 
on details of the version of compatibilism 
socially practiced or defended. The concept 
of a moral subject, on the other hand, is a 
descriptive or natural one.12 
Keeping in mind tbat the requirements for moral 
subjectivity are just consciousness and sentience, 
Sberidan completes bis point by stating 
Chuck the concept of a moral subject, our 
belief that ourselves and others deserve moral 
consideration, ...and we bave nothing. Moral 
reasoning loses its point altogether. 13 
Clearly, we want to save our notion of a moral 
subject, yet without necessarily talking about beliefs 
per se or any other related intentionality issue. I propose 
that we move from a purely Kantian view to a more 
Heideggarian one. This is to essentially view value as 
external to ourselves, not as originating witll ourselves. 
Taking tllis position, of course, requires that we lose 
some of our self-importance, that we view ourselves as 
part of the world, as members of a species among other 
species. It is to adopt a holistic attitude toward nature 
and, bence, recognize tllat Nature itself is a necessary 
condition for our existence. The existence of things in 
nature has afforded us not only life but also possibility. 
We are what we are because of IT. IT allows us to 
flourisb; IT lets us be. And because of that, we need to 
adopt an attitude of graciousness, Le., realize that we 
have been graced with existence and possibility. IT 
gives us tllis, and for tllat we need to realize ITs value. 
An attitude of graciousness, tllen, requires an attitude 
of respect, not harm. And this attitude of respect is not 
just limited to animals; it should also open the door to 
the environment itself. 
Eliminativism, tllen, doesn't bave to pose a threat 
to us. But this will entail changing our view ofourselves 
as all-important by virtue of our rationality to one wbicb 
realizes that, at base, we are one species among many 
and that these others give us (to a great extent) our being. 
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He arrived one day 
And claimed a corner of the yard, 
The whirling dervish tomcat bully 
Tried his usual tricks 
But he just wearily hissed 
And stayed 
Curled up tight 
On his bed of leaves 
For over a day. 
He walked right into my heart 
This sad old battered old cat. 
He had a certain dignity 
Hissing while arching his chin 
To be rubbed. 
Wanting comfort 
Yet not believing in it. 
He wasn't pretty, 
Aged and clumsy and tired 
Big old jowls 
And black and white splotched fur, 
Which only once in a while 
He washed after eating. 
He took up residence in the old doghouse 
Empty since my dog died 
But full of wann clean straw. 
I had to tempt him out to eat. 
I knew what he wanted. 
Once before I had found a cat 
Looking for a place to die 
And I had tempted her 
To choose life. 
And so, once again 
I will weigh the balance 
And for better or for worse 
Persuade this old traveller 
To live 
And to find reason to live. 
Mary de La Valette 
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